Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Expatriate, Israel, Israelis, Tel Aviv
August 1 marked my two year anniversary of living in Israel and so I’d like to dedicate this post to some random musings about the place and my time here. Tel Aviv is where I’ve spent the brunt of my time and over the years and the city has offered me some real life knowledge from her streets, it has cradled me in her bosom and I have sought to suckle nourishment from her tit. My first lesson was the most important and has guided me throughout my stay here. It came from an excessively exuberant falafel man who yelled at me with a rough Israeli accent in English “You want onions man?! Onions are good for your dick!” What salesmanship, I thought to myself, “pile ‘em on buddy,” I replied while wondering if this wise man of Israel had any other natural male enhancement products splayed out in the serving bar of his falafel stand. Luckily, I had learned this lesson in my initial weeks here so I was off to a grand beginning.
Next, the streets taught me about Israeli stoicism, grit and determination in the face of danger. I watched a lone man hold his ground in the face of tens of halted, honking and ferocious Israeli motorists in the middle of a crosswalk that was red. He wasn’t supposed to be walking on a red, but then again many believed the Jews weren’t even supposed to have founded a state and built Tel Aviv to begin with. As the man gestured his hand to his ear, the sound of the horns swelled, he wanted more, more baby, more. Inspiring. He stood there for about two minutes, the motorists laying on their horns the entire time. For the grand finale, this man of men finished with a big middle finger and went on his way, a hero in my eyes. “That was one bad-ass dude,” I thought out loud. “He was a bad-ass,” a smoking cab driver with his window down said in agreement.
While Western in many ways Tel Aviv and Israel in general still doesn’t fit the bill entirely. When gauging the ‘Westerness’ of a country, one can typically tell a lot by the smoking culture and the laws in place to curb the barbaric practice. 14 year olds in Israel still have adequate access to obscurely placed cigarette machines and while a smoking ban has ‘officially’ taken affect, the notices typically garner the same response that they would receive in a college dorm room. Keep blowing smoke in ‘the man’s’ face Israel, it gives me Obama-like hope.
One often hears of the schism in Israeli society between the religious and the secular. I experienced this first hand while volunteering at Kibbutz Yotvata in the Negev. I was relegated to ‘dish wash bitch’ in the maznon, the Israeli version of a gas and go mini market fully equipped with a crappy restaurant. The Rabbi explained to me that I had to wash the dishes in a kosher manner. He then explained to me the time consuming process in which I was to carry out this religious duty. Then, like a T.V. sitcom, the secular kibbutznik maznon manager came in ten seconds after the Rabbi left room and told me to disregard what the Rabbi had said and to do things as quickly as possible, which amounted to a non-kosher method. So when the Rabbi entered one day and saw me making some un-kosher dishes he gave it to me. I just nodded my head, put down my dishes and left the wash room. “I’m not even Jewish man,” I told him on the way out, “don’t involve me in your inter-faith disputes. It doesn’t bother me one way or another. I just want some finality on the issue.” That job was lame anyway I was happy to walk away. My friend, who was Polish, had a better gig than me, and for a good self-respecting American that’s just degrading no matter the humility imbued in me.
So, I’m almost two years as an expatriate in Israel. For me, Israel was a new place. I had never visited before I came, never had exposure to the Hebrew language, or Jews for that matter, and my travel experience was limited to ‘Western countries.’ Two years as an expatriate. In terms of experiences, I suppose that equals about five years as a non-émigré. Living abroad you get wise a little quicker, live a little faster and learn some hard knocks about life a little more often. I’ve started to accumulate the sort of memories that one is reminded of when rummaging through an old attic, somewhat hazy, but stimulating, as if capable of providing a window to glance back at another part of your life when you would have hardly recognized yourself. I knew I was a seasoned ex-pat when I began despising tourists because they simply annoyed me, because they read the travel page in the New York Times before they came and think they know all the hot-spots in Tel Aviv. As if some columnist with a whole weeks-worth of experience in the city and an Israeli friend could really know anything about the place. Then, I began despising Israelis who took me for a tourist. I understand Israelis encounter Americans quite often but just because I speak shitty Hebrew with an American mivta (accent) does not mean I went to Jew school for eight years in New York and am now here for a visit with birthright. Maybe it’s a personal issue but Eich Omrim Traveler Beivrit (How do you say traveler in Hebrew) because that’s what I am and there is a huge unbridgeable gap between a tourist and a traveler. But, I must say, an interesting phenomenon exists in Israel. Whereas typically one would assume that if you make an effort to learn the language in another country you would be treated with more respect by the locals, in Israel this logic is flawed. Sometimes, I prefer English, my blessed mother tongue, so that I receive prompt and pleasant service with a smile. Furthermore, it seems that Israelis are often more precise in English than they are in Hebrew when providing assistance. I’m sorry but yashar, yashar, yamina, az smolah (straight, straight, right then left) tells me nothing about finding my target destination, maybe its slang. I also prefer to use English when speaking with police officers, “I’m sorry I didn’t understand the sign,” it said ‘Don’t walk on red, crosswalk being monitored, violators will be fined,’” as long as you keep on with English they give up and move on.
But nothing draws my ire like moral self-righteous Westerners who come here thinking they even have an opinion about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. My anger springs from the fact that they remind me of myself when I first got here. They have a little bit of knowledge and a strong opinion, the worst of combinations. They feel like the conflict genuinely concerns them, like it’s a burden on the world’s conscience and they are the frontline warriors for truth and justice. I have studied the conflict and have experienced it in some ways just by living and traveling here and the more knowledge I have the more I see the conflict as intractable, as a battle that isn’t really mine to fight. But maybe my apathy stems from the fact that I lack the kind of faith that requires me to give a shit about who controls any of Jerusalem’s holy sites. There is no use making it rocket science, at the core of the conflict is a struggle between two national movements over the same territory, a struggle that is infused with a strong religious dimension that only adds to the intractability. I realized some time ago that both sides are right—morally, intellectually and actually—in their own minds and that no 1000 page study will ever change or clarify that ‘fact’ for either side. Polemics in the guise of scholarship on the issue are merely intended to lend another level of legitimacy to one or the other political cause (That’s not to say that there isn’t good scholarship on the conflict out there, it is just to say that a good portion of it is political trash).
Sorry for that tirade but if living in this place for two years has taught me anything it’s that sometimes you just have to let it out.
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Iran, Israel, U.S. Middle East Policy
The following is in response to an article penned by Justin Raimondo on antiwar.com. While I don’t oppose the position the author advocates (defeating legislation that amounts to a declaration of war with Iran), I find the manner in which he frames the discussion to be problematic. While the article is peppered with disclaimers and justifiers, bluntly, it suggests that Jews control U.S. foreign policy and Israel is threatening to drag the U.S. into war by initiating a strike on Iran. It appears that the author has very little knowledge of the policy debates going on in Israel and the United States. Moreover, for one who apparently identifies with a group of policy advocates that claims to be solely guided by realist thinking it’s strange that his interpretation smacks of the extraordinary.
If the administration and the Israeli lobby can be accused of war-mongering then it is only fair to accuse Mr. Raimondo of anti-war mongering. I’m not an advocate of striking Iran; I am in agreement with Mr. Raimondo that it would be potentially disastrous for a variety of regional and international actors. My biggest concern is that the manner in which the author portrays the potential for conflict is overly alarmist. Furthermore, throughout the author perpetuates some pretty conspiratorial views about U.S. decision making in the Middle East with regards to U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iraq and Iran and Israel’s role in shaping that policy. I take particular issue with the following statement, “Yet it cannot be denied – as I wrote before a single shot had been fired – that the Iraq war was launched, as Klein notes, to make the Middle East safer for Israel, just as the current push for “regime change” in Iran is energized by the same motive.”
The U.S. invasion of Iraq involved many considerations, some ideological, some geo-strategic, most ill-conceived. However, to state so directly that the over-riding goal of invading Iraq was to ensure Israeli security suggests naivety. Very briefly, the U.S. hoped that by invading Iraq they could:
• Establish a pro-American Iraq to act as a substitute for a U.S.-Saudi relationship that got all the more problematic in the wake of September 11.
• Further contain and confront Iran with the additional leverage of military bases in Iraq.
• Ensure energy interests and the American position in the Gulf.
• Boost liberal political forces in the region in the hope creating a new regional order predicated on good-governance and democracy (whatever the definition of that was).
As I said, these goals, and there were others, were largely ill-conceived and only plausible to those sitting around a conference table in Washington D.C. Regardless it would appear that the U.S. entered Iraq to perpetuate what policy makers perceived were U.S. strategic interests, not Israeli. If there happens to be a confluence of interests between the U.S. and Israel in some respects this need not be construed as a grand Israeli/AIPAC plot to dupe the dumb and dopey U.S. government into doing the regional bidding of the sly and cunning Israelis.
The current U.S.-Iran dispute and possible avenues of dealing with Iran is being approached from the same U.S.-centric perspective, meaning U.S. interests are paramount in the minds of policy makers. Certainly perspectives in Washington differ greatly on this issue especially in light of U.S. tribulations in Iraq. General Petraeus for one has recently discounted the notion that there will be a strike on Iran. Regardless, rest assured that the U.S. will not commit itself to a potentially disastrous military engagement with Iran for the sake of Israel alone. While Israel will act in its own security interests, it’s not likely that Israel would be so brazen so as to gamble its fate on initiating a conflict that has the potential to embroil the U.S. in a situation it might not support.
Iran’s goals since the revolution have been made clear. From the get-go Khomeini established that Iran’s primary strategic objective is to rid the United States from the ‘Persian’ Gulf in order to restore the Iranian lake to its natural hegemon. This is at the heart of the ‘Iranian challenge.’ Clearly, such an objective places America and primarily her Arab Gulf allies on a collision course with the Islamic Republic, whether that trajectory will result in war is unpredictable. While the standard canard of the ‘Jews run the world’ is often an easy explanation for U.S. policy in the Middle East, it lacks plausibility, suggests a huge overestimation of pro-Israeli Jewish influence in the U.S. and ultimately amounts to naught.
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: linkage, Martin Kramer, Middle East Conflicts
While in Jordan about a month ago some friends and I were sitting around chatting politics when one Jordanian put it to me. Come on man, he asked, is not the resolution to the Israeli-Arab conflict the ultimate fix for the region? His question suggested that he ascribed to a commonly held belief in linkage. That is that conflicts in the Middle East are intertwined and the resolution of one can lead to the resolution of them all and that the Israeli-Arab conflict represents the keystone crisis which needs to be resolved if others are to be remedied, a sort of domino theory in reverse. Far from just a common sentiment on the street, linkage has been adopted as a widely perpetuated mantra for policy makers, academics, and interested observers alike when thinking about conflict resolution in the Middle East.
So how credible is this belief in linkage? Well, it’s much like religion in that the theory’s credibility is largely a matter of faith. When thinking of the issue I always recall a terse quip I heard from a professor at TAU a while back, “What? You think if the Arab-Israeli conflict is finished tomorrow, even if Israel never existed or ceases to exist today, that all the Arabs will pick up their guitars and start singing ‘let’s all get along.’ Not gonna happen.”
An interesting dialogue concerning the linkage theory has recently taken place on MESHnet. Martin Kramer drove the point home that linkage theory is, in a very rigid sense, mythical. He also argues rather convincingly that an overzealous belief in linkage is perpetuated by those who simplify the region by thinking about it in terms of the European system and its successful reordering since World War II. He created a list of nine contemporary “clusters of conflict” existing in the region that he largely considers to exist independent of one another (see article for details). Kramer makes a valid point. Crises in the Middle East are not always connected along a linear path and certainly don’t all lead to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Obviously, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was not caused by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, a sectarian Sunni-Shia rivalry or the regional Islamist challenge to state governments, fair enough. However, conflicts in the region suggest a higher degree of permeability in the region than Kramer lets on.
If we are to use the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as an example again we can say it very generally occurred as a result of an inter-Arab crisis that involved irredentist Iraqi claims harbored since the formation of the Arab state order in the wake of World War I. But Iraq’s nearly decade-long conflict with Iran certainly impacted Sadaam’s decision to move on Kuwait. Sadaam felt slighted by the unenthusiastic support he received from the Arab Gulf states in return for his sacrifice. Iraq had just fought an excruciating war, was bankrupted and had nothing to show in return, the port at Umm Qasr remained the country’s only access to the precious waters of the Gulf. So while the Persian-Arab conflict was not a primary cause for Iraq’s takeover of Kuwait, the two seemingly separate conflicts proved permeable. Another example of the permeability of conflicts is the link between Iran’s regional rise and the revival of intensified Shia-Sunni antagonisms in the Arab world. The Arab-Persian conflict is intimately bound up in the Shia-Sunni conflict across the region. A primary contemporary example of this connection is Iraq. Arab Sunni states refuse to support the Shia government in Baghdad due to their conviction that it is subservient to Tehran. So not only would the Sunni Arabs be losing a principal bulwark to the Shia (Iraq being the first Arab state with a Shia government) but it is assumed that Iran would be granted unprecedented influence in the Arab East as well. Any gain for the Shia is perceived as a gain for Iran, hence for Sunni Arabs Iraq amounts to a zero sum game on both the Shia-Sunni and the Arab-Persian fronts. So, the relationship between regional conflicts, it would seem, far from being directly linked, are also by no means disconnected. Rather, they more closely mirror relations among cousins—some are closer to others while yet some remain distant relatives.
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: the Special Relationship
My last post on this issue proved somewhat controversial, unsubstantiated for some and downright ludicrous for others. The topic is difficult due to the fact that it is an emotive issue and many approach the subject with strong pre-conceived notions about the appropriateness of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and Israel’s overall contribution to U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Here, I argue that Israel’s strategic importance to the U.S. and the majority of Arab states lies in the fact that Israel acts as a regional support for the Arab state order, something the U.S. and regional allies have a vested interest in ensuring. Should Arab states begin to unravel, the consequences for Arab governments would be their removal and U.S. interests in the region may be damaged beyond repair.
While proving resilient, Arab states face continuing challenges to state cohesion due to many factors—the Arab state system was created out of territories ruled by various Muslim empires for about 1300 years. The borders that were imposed according to colonial interests and the states formed as a result were in many ways anathema to the pre-existing regional order. Furthermore, strong sub-state and supra-state identities have proven durable and act as obstacles to state solidarity. Until 1967, Arab nationalism served as a supra-state identity that was harnessed by Arab leaders to threaten the sovereignty of individual Arab states. More recently, political Islam has emerged as a supra-state ideology presenting challenges to Arab regimes and the boundaries of their states. Moreover, sub-state identities and loyalties to them are now being evinced in Iraq in the wake of the U.S. invasion threatening fragmentation and restructuring of the Arab order. After almost a century of existence, the challenges to the Arab state emanating from the aforementioned factors have not been completely resolved.
So how does Israel help maintain the current Arab order? An historical example that comes to mind would be Israel’s safeguarding of Jordan against a Syrian invasion in 1970-71 when King Hussein was struggling to expel the PLO from Jordan. Had Israel not threatened an attack on Syria, the Syrians may have felt unhindered to move into Jordan. In the name of the Palestinian struggle, Syria also sought the removal of the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in order to establish their hegemony in what was viewed as a natural sphere of Syrian influence. In this case Israel was the only regional deterrent capable of staving off Syrian intervention. Israel’s unique strategic position in this case was realized by Nixon and Kissinger and raised Israeli strategic prestige for many in Washington.
More recently, Israel and the anti-Shi’i and anti-Iranian Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have common ground in the struggle to stem the rising tide of regional challengers: Iran and its proxies in the region seeking to destabilize and possibly overturn the regional order. Israel’s war in Lebanon in 2006 serves as a prime example. The status quo Arab states tacitly condoned Israel’s attempt to destroy Hezbollah and were perhaps frustrated that they didn’t do a better job. Why? Israel’s war against Hezbollah was virtually a war against Iran and its influence in Arab Lebanon. While the Arabs protested the excessive tactics used by the Israelis, Nasrallah was blamed for inciting the conflict and bringing war to Lebanon. Most urgently, Hezbollah threatens to ensconce Lebanon, a founding member of the Arab League, in the Iranian orbit. Such a prospect is unacceptable to the status quo Arabs and potentially devastating for regional order. Hence, Israel, the U.S. and the status quo Arabs all have a vested interest in buttressing the pro-Western coalition in Lebanon.
Israel is also trying to contain Hamas, an actor whose aspirations far exceed those of the Palestinian national struggle, by supporting Fatah and applying harsh measures against Gaza in an attempt to discredit Hamas (one can certainly contest the effectiveness of this strategy). While Fatah still holds sway in the West Bank, the strength of their military forces is semi-ambiguous. What, for example, would happen to Fatah if Israel evacuated completely from the West Bank? Would they fall to Hamas as quickly as they did in Gaza? The presence of the IDF in the West Bank makes a Hamas takeover there more difficult as Israel and the PA continue to work towards an agreement. The U.S. has a strong stake in playing a role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli crisis and one could surmise that a Hamas takeover of the Palestinian national project in all of the Palestinian territories would mean a degeneration of the conflict back into a zero-sum game.
In sum, Israel is a strategic ally for the U.S. and status quo Arab states in that it seeks to maintain the legitimacy of the current Arab order in the face of regional forces seeking to destabilize it, albeit for its own selfish reasons of being. In a time when the fate of Arab Iraq is indiscernible and Iranian influence in the region is at a level like no time in centuries, Arab states looking to maintain their rule, and the Arab order in place since the early 1920s, are not looking to Israel as their greatest threat. On an emotional and ideological level, Arab states and their populations are hostile to the existence of Israel and always will be. Hence, U.S. favoritism towards Israel damages America’s reputation in the Arab world but this doesn’t necessarily translate into irreparably harming America’s strategic interests. If anything, all the governments of the region are firmly embedded in the U.S. orbit with the exception of Syria and Iran and their sub-state clients. Radical forces that have arisen in the Arab world to oppose U.S. interests cannot simply be blamed on American support of Israel, though it is certainly a factor. Keep in mind that among Bin Laden’s many grievances foremost among them was the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, troops that were deployed there at the request of the Saudi ruling family to correct the disruption in the Arab state order brought about by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In terms of obstacles facing U.S.-Arab relations, the close U.S.-Israeli relationship is but one of many.
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Academic Boycott of Israel, British Academics, Bullshit, UCU
Some time ago I wrote a commentary about the efforts of academics in Britain to boycott Israeli academics (view article). It seems that some in the U.K. have not been discouraged to give up this absurd campaign as the University and College Union of Britain (UCU) has again adopted anti-Israel measures in their most recent congressional session. They continue to wage a war that is not in the least bit necessary and their most current attempt emphasizes the depths into which some of British academia has slipped. Text from the resolution follows though the full document can be found here. I added the UCU’s position towards Cuba just to give you a sense of the sort of people we are talking about here. Judging by the resolution on Cuba one would think Fidel Castro presides over the congress. The UCU is comprised of about 120,000 people affiliated in some way with academics in Britain, presumably educated people. British institutions have long been known for the quality of their scholarship however I for one am glad to be receiving a serious education under the supervision of serious scholars in Israel. Note the issue on Israel followed Darfur…coincidence??
20 – Cuba Solidarity Northumbria University
Congress notes:
- the tremendous progress that has been made at all levels in education and health in Cuba since the revolution in 1959
- that these achievements are even more remarkable given the unremitting hostility that Cuba has faced from its hugely more powerful neighbour, the USA
Congress
- agrees to play a full part in events marking the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, celebrating the huge gains the Cuban people have made
- condemns the British government for its continuing support of the US strategy to isolate Cuba and reverse the socialist revolution
- calls for the release of the Miami 5 who were not guilty of espionage but were only monitoring anti-Cuban espionage groups
- resolves to increase our support for the activities of Cuba Solidarity Campaign.
CARRIED
24 – Darfur Lambeth College
This Congress agrees to work with unions, students, Darfurian and refugee communities, and other concerned organisations to bring pressure to bear on the government to speak out against atrocities in Darfur and the Chinese government’s complicity with the Khartoum regime, and to allow Darfurian asylum seekers the right to remain in this country free from threat of deportation to Khartoum with the real possibility of torture or death that holds.
25 – Composite: Palestine and the occupation University of Brighton – Eastbourne, University of Brighton – Grand Parade, University of East London Docklands, National Executive Committee
Congress notes the
1. continuation of illegal settlement, killing of civilians and the impossibility of civil life, including education
2. humanitarian catastrophe imposed on Gaza by Israel and the EU
3. apparent complicity of most of the Israeli academy
4. legal attempts to prevent UCU debating boycott of Israeli academic institutions; and legal advice that such debates are lawful
Congress affirms that
5. criticism of Israel or Israeli policy are not, as such, anti-semitic;
6. pursuit and dissemination of knowledge are not uniquely immune from their moral and political consequences;
Congress resolves that
7. colleagues be asked to consider the moral and political implications of educational links with Israeli institutions, and to discuss the occupation with individuals and institutions concerned, including Israeli colleagues with whom they are collaborating;
8. UCU widely disseminate the personal testimonies of UCU and PFUUPE delegations to Palestine and the UK, respectively;
9. the testimonies will be used to promote a wide discussion by colleagues of the appropriateness of continued educational links with Israeli academic institutions;
10. UCU facilitate and encourage twinning arrangements and other direct solidarity with Palestinian institutions;
11. Ariel College, an explicitly colonising institution in the West Bank, be investigated under the formal Greylisting Procedure.
CARRIED
25A.1 University College London
- Delete point 3.
- Point 8: After respectively; Add ‘and statements from Israeli academics and British academics who have links with Israel’
- Point 9: After appropriateness. delete ‘of’ and add ‘for and against’.
- Add a new final point 12 (will become 11 if 3 is deleted):
‘No decision on cutting educational links with Israeli academic institutions will be made without a ballot of all members.’
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Daniel Kurtzer, INSS, Itamar Rabinovich, Peace in the Middle East, Saeb Erakat, U.S. involvement in the Middle East
The Institute of National Security Studies in Israel was the venue of a fascinating round table last evening. The panel featured three able, experienced and truly erudite individuals: Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli Ambassador to Israel and chief negotiator of Syrian-Israeli peace talks in the early 1990s, Saeb Erakat, the chief Palestinian negotiator for the past decade, and Daniel Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Cairo and Tel Aviv. Before a small audience of about 35 people some big issues were raised and discussed with a refreshing candor that only an open and academic setting can provide.
I’ll try to cut to the basics of the talk running over some of the most interesting points, but perhaps some context is necessary. The roundtable took place within the broader framework of a three day conference entitled, ‘The Global and the Local: International Efforts to Resolve local Conflicts.’ A discussion of the United States and its role in Middle Eastern peace, specifically in regards to the Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli tracks, was the theme addressed throughout the panel this blog entry is concerned with though it wasn’t the only issue.
In short, it was agreed that it is up to local actors to spearhead peace initiatives in the region, they are the actors most intimately involved, with the most understanding of what needs to be done to reach a deal, and with the most to lose or gain, hence they must act as the drivers. However, U.S. involvement is necessary, but as Rabinovich noted the U.S. should not enter the peace process too early rather it needs to step in late and play the role of closer, or in his words,“to go the last ten yards.” He used U.S. incentive of incrementally waiving Jordan’s $700 million dollar debt as an example of effective U.S. intervention in closing a deal (though this was almost spoiled by Newt Gingrich). The U.S. it was surmised, was not a great negotiator but rather a necessary facilitator. But while local actors need to initiate peace processes, Kurtzer noted that as a U.S. President you cannot ignore Middle East peace too long, it’s in U.S. interest to engage lest something occur that would bite Washington and its interests in the ass. Kurtzer (speaking from a realist perspective, as all of the panelists were) noted that the Bush administration excluded this from his Middle East policy and rather than expressing vigorous U.S. interest in Middle East peace at the outset of his tenure early on he turned to the issue at Annapolis late in the game when it was too late to be effective. However, if Kurtzer’s assessment is true and Annapolis fails due to the Bush administrations shunning of the issue throughout his tenure then Saeb Erakat provided some forlorn warnings for the future of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the wider region. Erakat spoke frankly. He wants nothing more than a Palestinian state next to Israel. He said this in certain terms and he was unequivocal that he desired this not out of compassion or new found love for the Jewish state but for the good of his own people, but he desired it nonetheless. A man in Erakat’s position harbors no illusions, he quipped “I am the most disadvantaged negotiator in history,” he hasn’t even a state. His message to this mostly Israeli audience was stark, “If I go to the Palestinian people at the end of 2008 with a successful agreement, Hamas will disappear. If not, I must be prepared to have my own disappearing act,” he continued that “If there is not an agreement by the end of 2008, this region will go down a path that no Americans or Europeans can prevent from becoming one of darkness and extremism.” (I’m not 100% sure on the accuracy of every word in these quotes but the main thrust is certainly correct). From these statements, one could deduce that Erakat is using urgency as a way to extract Israeli concessions in negotiations, however the man I saw speaking did not seem to believe that the elongation of the conflict was in his, Fatah’s, the Palestinian, Israeli, regional, U.S. or world interest. Erakat repeated throughout that the centers of gravity in the Middle East were shifting, traditional pillars of power were crumbling and the regional support systems of the last six decades were changing—and he certainly is not the first to suggest this, as a close observer of the region over the past few years this notion is widely held among students and scholars in the region. The shift Erakat spoke of is the regional tilt toward political Islam and the empowerment of these forces in Lebanon and in Gaza and towards the backer of this realignment, Tehran. The Abbas government, Erakat inferred, would be a partner in helping to roll this threat back and Israel had better recognize this by providing him the agreement he needed that would act as a club to beat Hamas with. He called the Hamas coup in Gaza “the worst thing to happen to the Palestinians since 1967,” and keep in mind the Palestinian national movement endured some pretty hard blows from June 1967 to June 2007. Was Erakat being dramatic? I don’t think so. Erakat was adamant that it was time for both sides to make the tough decisions and sacrifices to do a deal, the time for negotiations, confidence building measures, and consultations was over and if decisions aren’t made then there will be no one left on the Palestinian side to deal with. Erakat made an interesting case, but he seemed to suggest that both the Israelis and the Palestinians knew precisely what they would have to sacrifice to reach an agreement, that is which ‘issues’ they would have to compromise on. Personally, I am not certain the sacrifices are clearly defined while I hope that they get defined quickly and by the end of the year, I don’t know that they will. It seems however, that attainment of an agreement with Israel is the last gasp for Fatah and they will go a long way to achieve it, however Fatah would rather be put to the sword of Hamas rather than accept an incomprehensive and unsatisfactory Israeli offer, they will not present the Palestinians with an agreement out of humility. Erakat realized that a Palestinian state would be the most unique, powerless, and limited state in the world but he remarked that while this can be tolerated, “We will not allow anything to have limitations on our dignity.” It should be realized now that Israel in tandem with the U.S. will have to be partners in allowing the Palestinians that dignity. From the U.S.-Israeli perspective one major thing needs to be kept in mind in the crucial months ahead: Fatah’s end goal is a state side by side with Israel, Hamas’s differs radically.
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Israel, Syria, Syrian-Israeli Peace
With all these rumors of peace agreements, diplomacy, and bargaining I’m beginning to think I’m not in the Middle East—where are the wars, the rhetorical bombast and the chest thumping with which we have become accustomed? I commented on Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations a while back but today Haaretz broke some interesting stories that released previously undisclosed information, certainly worth a glance. The outline of the agreement looks to be interesting. Admittedly, I can’t speak with much authority on the issue but I can direct you to those who can, see Jon Alterman’s contribution at MESHnet.
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Egypt, Egyptian Mediation, Hamas, Palestinian Factions
Egypt in coordination with the Saudis began attempting to arrange meetings between Hamas and Fatah officials in Cairo in December shortly following Annapolis. At first efforts appeared fruitless with Hamas claiming Abbas established outlandish preconditions for talks while Abbas wanted to see Hamas actions in Gaza rescinded. On January 23 Hamas breached the border between Gaza and Egypt. No doubt this event acted as a major motivation for the Egyptians to become more pro-active in the mediation process. Before the border incident reports mentioned that Egyptian ‘mediators’ were working on getting the two major Palestinian factions together, days after it was President Mubarak who invited both factions for a meeting in Cairo. Hamas immediately accepted the invitation and left Abbas with little choice but to also attend. Hamas seemed to feel their actions in opening the Gaza-Egyptian border gave them an upper hand in negotiations with all parties and solidified their position in Gaza. They forced Abbas to reconcile with the fact that Hamas controlled Gaza and that it wasn’t going to give up control for the sake of negotiations…or did they. Blowing the border also appeared to have vindicated the Hamas takeover in Gaza; they could claim to be acting in the interests of suffering Gazans. As of January 30, Abbas was still sticking to pre-conditions for reconciliation even in his talks with Mubarak in Cairo. In an interview with al-Hayat in late February, Abu Mazen reiterated again that he demanded Hamas admit that what they perpetrated in Gaza amounted to a coup and that he would not enter into negotiations until this was established. He also blamed Hamas for making the Egyptians appear to be contributing to the suffering of Gaza by breaching the Egyptian-Gaza border. Abbas claims it is not the Egyptians who are responsible for the blockade of Gaza but rather Hamas due to rocket attacks on Israel and their refusal to recognize international agreements made with the PLO. On March 9, Cairo’s mediation plan was revealed—main points included
1-Lifting the siege through reinstating the agreement on the crossing points of 2005, and if Hamas has reservations on this agreement, they can be examined after the reinstatement of the agreement, and not before it.
2-On this basis, in order for Israel to allow the easing of the siege, it is imperative to establish calm, i.e. to stop firing missiles once and for all from the Gaza Strip in the direction of Israel.
3-Hamas should allow the members of the Palestinian [National] Authority to return to work at the crossing points according to the agreement.
4-In exchange for this, Israel should refrain from strikes, aggression, and assassinations.
Cairo seemed prompted to seek an end to the situation due to the incident at the border, one Egyptian official stated that, “Cairo has explained to all sides that this is an Egyptian aim that is related to the national security and the stability of the situation in the region, and Egypt will not allow a repetition of the bad situation that led to the explosion in its direction.” Cairo’s efforts are also notable because they are attempting to bring Hamas and Fatah into some sort of modus vivendi so that the sufferings in Gaza can be eased and negotiations can then be more effectively pursued between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Cairo is also one of the few regional actors who can politically engage all sides publicly and in this sense is a sort of natural intermediary. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, while also keen to spearhead regional diplomatic initiatives, cannot do so due to their relations, or lack thereof, with Israel. Reports stressed that the U.S. and the Europeans were supportive of Egyptian efforts; this may be an attempt by Cairo to enhance its regional and international political prestige if the agreement can be successful under their guidance. Egypt’s decline as a regional political force after their peace with Israel is well-known, but now wounds have healed and Egypt is virtually the only Arab state with enough political influence and necessary contacts to conduct such mediation.
Egypt received confirmation from Hamas that they desired a tahdi’a (calming) and would agree to allow Fatah forces and European monitors to operate the Rafah crossing so long as Israeli military incursions ceased. Egypt’s intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, is heading the Egyptian mediation effort. The Egyptians expressed that the major objective is to first achieve a halt in Israeli and Palestinian military operations.
Egypt appears to understand the rather obvious dilemma regarding any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. An agreement cannot be concluded solely between Abbas and Israel, Hamas and the other Palestinian factions must agree to go along with any deal lest they act as a spoiler. Mohamed Basyouni, head of the Shura Council’s committee for Arab affairs, and former Egyptian ambassador to Israel stated that “Egypt is dealing with Hamas from a security perspective and on the basis that Hamas represents a fact on the ground.” Indeed, Egypt never recognized the Hamas takeover in Gaza but has realized that Hamas must be engaged in order to reach a deal while the group also represents a security threat to Egypt. The breach of the Gaza border made these realizations all the more immediate and should be viewed as the main factor in reenergizing Cairo’s mediation efforts. Furthermore, Cairo is receiving strong U.S. support in their current effort, not a bad thing to garner before an unpopular transfer of political power in Egypt.
Fatah officials seemed optimistic that Egyptian mediation concerning the Gaza strip was nearly successful in late April. Muhammad Hurani, a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, claimed that the Egyptians were working for a cease-fire in Gaza between armed Palestinian groups, Hamas and Israel because it was a matter of “Egyptian national security.” Fatah backed the Egyptian effort to bring about this deal but continued to stress that Abbas is still the legitimate governmental authority in Gaza. Though it remains to be seen which Palestinian faction will be strengthened should a deal be implemented.
Currently (late May), Egyptian mediation seems to be on the cusp of success, though it will certainly be a fragile ceasefire, it could pave the way for more concrete agreements in the future.
Today Israel will be celebrating its 60th year of independence while the Palestinians will be commemorating the 60th year of the nakba, the catastrophe, which translates into 0 years of statehood. Yeah, the statehood tally looks like the score of a lopsided peewee football game but this particular match may only be entering the third quarter and the contestants appear poised to play on if not for a resolution then for glory, God (but different God’s, by now they must be different) and team. So what can we look for in the next half of the game? Quite frankly more of the same. Reporters interviewed players from each side at half time and don’t report any progress on the arrangements made at Annapolis to establish a Palestinian state by the end of the year. Apparently the two sides were only participating in the political equivalent of a false start. In fact Palestinian-Israeli negotiations may be in a sorrier state now than they were when non-existent. At least when negotiations and statehood within a year weren’t the proclaimed objective no one harbored any expectations. However, spectators in the crowd have been distracted by more immediate and consequential problems on the field. When Palestine’s QB, Mahmoud, told his WR, Ismail, to run a Hail Mary, Ismail refused citing that he preferred to do an Islamic pattern like those run in the time of the prophet. Mahmoud tried to explain to Ismail that the Hail Mary was the only play left in the book that would work against Israel’s defense but to no avail. Disagreements over play calling resulted in multiple delay of game penalties and the Palestinian team soon found themselves minus yards with their backs against their own end zone. Furthermore, Ismail convinced half the team that he should be QBing the squad claiming that not only will he put points on the board but he thinks he can lead Palestine to total victory over Israel despite the deficit. Mahmoud was disheartened by this blow—how could he effectively lead the team to a touchdown if he didn’t command respect and loyalty from his teammates? But, then he remembered an upperclassman, Yasir, who taught him a thing or two about perseverance and proved that even when your statistics aren’t stellar and things look down it’s still possible to make the all-Palestine team. With a few words of encouragement from certain influential coaches on the sidelines who really despise Ismail’s attitude and his locker room exploits Mahmoud was back on the field. But on the ensuing play Ismail’s guys went on one when the count was on two, got blasted by the Israeli defense forces and blamed Mahmoud for the confusion and Israel for the bruises. How long this will continue? The crowd had no ideas but they were certain Palestine won’t be moving the ball forward so long as it continues.
On the Israeli side the defenders are organized but its long established defensive strategy of offensive blitzes antagonizes some Palestinian supporters who continue to retaliate with attacks on Israel’s bleachers making it unpleasant to watch the boys and girls play. And if things weren’t messy enough in the stands, a faction of Israel’s more intoxicated supporters insist that the view is better from the Palestinian side and continue to build new seating in areas designated for Palestinian season ticket holders. Israel’s stadium engineers appear to tacitly condone this expansion even though it is structurally superfluous and Israel has more than enough seats in their assigned section. Israel’s coaching staff respects Mahmoud, they feel he’s shown good sportsmanship in the contest and they want him to succeed in his quest to deliver enough tangible gains for Palestine so they can honorably call an end to the game. But Israeli scouts remain wary of Ismail’s popularity and his promises to play on indefinitely. Sometimes the Israelis are left doubting Mahmoud’s natural born ability to outplay Ismail for his position. Furthermore, despite their seeming command of the game, the Israelis are winded and they may lack the endurance to go another two quarters hence they want to call it a game ASAP. Their whole fan base has at one time played on the field sometimes going both ways. But while they are gasping for a breather they refuse to stop playing until the stadium they are constructing and its landscaping looks satisfactory. However, Israel’s blueprints differ significantly from Palestine’s and most Palestinians still consider Israeli grounds their home field, something that even time won’t change. And if all this isn’t enough, it remains unclear as to whether Israel will agree to share the Jerusalem trophy it won back in 1967, perhaps the most prized symbolic treasure in all the Land.
So after 60 years of fierce competition the game still ain’t over. What a bummer, it’s getting anti-climactic to even continue watching, I won’t hold my breath in anticipation for a big play. It’s sunny and clear almost everyday in this country so there’s no hope for a rain out and the two opponents seem unable to even play to a draw. There’s no point in keeping score any longer it hasn’t dictated a victor yet. Yes, this game seems destined to be played for pride. Have a Happy or Bereft 60th, whichever you prefer.
DancesWithCamels 
Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Gaza, Gaza War, Israel
Haven’t posted in a while, here are some thoughts on the situation unfolding between Israel and Hamas.
Israel is conducting its current military campaign against Gaza in order to protect and defend some half million citizens in the western Negev, who are under persistent rocket barrage from Hamas. No doubt this is a motivating factor for the current military action, especially in light of upcoming elections in Israel. However, if the goal were to truly ensure Israel’s security, then why would the government choose to escalate the situation, in turn, making the security situation in Israel more perilous, something Israeli officials expected? More rockets have been launched by Hamas, more Israeli civilian casualties have been taken, and the increased possibility of large-scale intifada-type violence has spiked since military strikes have commenced, with the possibility of further escalation.
Seemingly, Israel is, at most, attempting to topple the Hamas government in Gaza and, at the very least, punishing them severely for not going away, even while Israel is certainly not interested in a long-term presence in the strip. In regards to the former objective, this is certainly achievable, but to what end? Renewing a tahdi‘a (Arabic: calming) that both Hamas and Israel felt was disadvantageous? Israeli action to punish Hamas amounts to taking a sledgehammer to a walnut. Punishment as such, however severe, is not a long-term strategy; but, obviously, some in the Israeli government felt it was the best immediate option among a short list of other less preferable ones.
In regards to the latter objective, the jury is still out as to the capability of Israel to achieve regime change, or elimination, with large-scale military force. After all, Hamas is a movement with a large constituency, not merely one leader or even a group of leaders. In other words, if you cut off the beasts head, it may simply grow two more that are uglier and nastier than the first. Furthermore, who would replace Hamas rule in Gaza? Surely not the Israelis or the Egyptians, both of whom want to wash their hands of the troublesome little territory. Then, Abbas? Some in the Fatah are sitting back in Ramallah relishing that Hamas is now paying dearly for their takeover of the strip in mid-2007 and for their refusal to reconcile with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah since that time. However, Abu Mazen’s legitimacy has been severely eroded by Israeli military action due to his prior diplomatic engagement with the Israelis and his obdurate, if not at times hostile, stance toward Hamas in Gaza. Indeed, since the initiation of Israeli strikes on Gaza, Abbas has remained mute. Though, in a step that should be viewed as a protective political measure, the PLO has announced the suspension of peace negotiations with Israel. This is an odd, perhaps unintended, consequence of Israel’s military action, considering Israel has spent the last year and a half trying to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas.
Israel has no good options for dealing with the Hamas government in Gaza. Since Hamas came to power in Gaza in mid-2007 and the tahdi‘a, agreed upon with Hamas through Egyptian intermediaries in mid-June of this year, Israel has attempted to starve Gaza by severely limiting the amount of goods into the strip. The Israelis implemented this policy, not because they are inhumane barbarians, but rather, with the intent of demonstrating to the Gazan people that the Hamas leadership was, irresponsible, inept, and incapable of improving the lives and opportunities of Gazans. There were many problems with pursuing such a strategy, foremost among them that it did not work; Hamas’s power did not falter. Gaza’s suffering has created a humanitarian crisis that has attracted the watchful eye of media outlets worldwide. Literally, an underground economy proliferated, and Hamas had little incentive to adhere to a calming, from which they were not benefiting in any way. How long did Israel expect Hamas to lie and bleed before they attempted to improve their condition?
Israel, of course, could not blockade Gaza by itself; Gaza shares a border with Egypt. Egypt also participated in the siege, for reasons relating to its own national security, by closing its own border crossing with Gaza, the Rafah crossing. Cairo also intended to use the crossing as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from Hamas. In the past year, Egypt has acted as a mediator between Israel and Hamas and Hamas and the PLO. However, Egyptian mediation proposals, which Hamas officials continually claimed favored Abbas, proved ineffective as Hamas remained unwilling to cede its control over Gaza to Abbas in the name of Palestinian reconciliation. Egyptian mediation can now be said to have bottomed out entirely with Israel’s recent military action—a move Cairo is seen to have tacitly condoned, and perhaps, privately cheered after the Egyptians were publicly enraged by what they considered to be Hamas’s snubbing of Palestinian Reconciliation talks, spearheaded by Cairo. Protests and violence directed at Egypt’s embassies across the Arab world need to be viewed in light of Arab sentiments that Cairo acted as an accomplice to the Israeli bombings of Gaza. Furthermore, President Mubarak did not cover his political bases too well when he met with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni less than twenty-four hours before Israel launched its first strikes.
In sum, from an Israeli perspective and those of Hamas’s other regional adversaries, military action does little to solve the overall crux of the matter, which is Hamas’s existence and empowerment in Gaza, especially if Israel does not intend to make a long-term military commitment, as Israeli officials have suggested. However, a return to the status quo ante is not exactly desirable either. Hence, all things considered, Israel is stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to Hamas in Gaza. If anything, perhaps Israel simply hoped to delay or prevent a Hamas takeover in the West Bank, a contingency that may not be unlikely when Abu Mazen’s mandate as President expires in early January.
Lost in all these events is the fate of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier taken captive in the summer of 2006. If Israel had truly hoped to secure his return, it seems that now his fate is sealed. Though, in Israel’s calculation, Hamas demands in exchange for his release were outrageous, even during the tahdi‘a, which offered the best window of opportunity to ensure his release.