No Choice but a Bad Choice: Israel’s Quandary in Gaza, Unachievable Strategic Objectives
Haven’t posted in a while, here are some thoughts on the situation unfolding between Israel and Hamas.
Israel is conducting its current military campaign against Gaza in order to protect and defend some half million citizens in the western Negev, who are under persistent rocket barrage from Hamas. No doubt this is a motivating factor for the current military action, especially in light of upcoming elections in Israel. However, if the goal were to truly ensure Israel’s security, then why would the government choose to escalate the situation, in turn, making the security situation in Israel more perilous, something Israeli officials expected? More rockets have been launched by Hamas, more Israeli civilian casualties have been taken, and the increased possibility of large-scale intifada-type violence has spiked since military strikes have commenced, with the possibility of further escalation.
Seemingly, Israel is, at most, attempting to topple the Hamas government in Gaza and, at the very least, punishing them severely for not going away, even while Israel is certainly not interested in a long-term presence in the strip. In regards to the former objective, this is certainly achievable, but to what end? Renewing a tahdi‘a (Arabic: calming) that both Hamas and Israel felt was disadvantageous? Israeli action to punish Hamas amounts to taking a sledgehammer to a walnut. Punishment as such, however severe, is not a long-term strategy; but, obviously, some in the Israeli government felt it was the best immediate option among a short list of other less preferable ones.
In regards to the latter objective, the jury is still out as to the capability of Israel to achieve regime change, or elimination, with large-scale military force. After all, Hamas is a movement with a large constituency, not merely one leader or even a group of leaders. In other words, if you cut off the beasts head, it may simply grow two more that are uglier and nastier than the first. Furthermore, who would replace Hamas rule in Gaza? Surely not the Israelis or the Egyptians, both of whom want to wash their hands of the troublesome little territory. Then, Abbas? Some in the Fatah are sitting back in Ramallah relishing that Hamas is now paying dearly for their takeover of the strip in mid-2007 and for their refusal to reconcile with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah since that time. However, Abu Mazen’s legitimacy has been severely eroded by Israeli military action due to his prior diplomatic engagement with the Israelis and his obdurate, if not at times hostile, stance toward Hamas in Gaza. Indeed, since the initiation of Israeli strikes on Gaza, Abbas has remained mute. Though, in a step that should be viewed as a protective political measure, the PLO has announced the suspension of peace negotiations with Israel. This is an odd, perhaps unintended, consequence of Israel’s military action, considering Israel has spent the last year and a half trying to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas.
Israel has no good options for dealing with the Hamas government in Gaza. Since Hamas came to power in Gaza in mid-2007 and the tahdi‘a, agreed upon with Hamas through Egyptian intermediaries in mid-June of this year, Israel has attempted to starve Gaza by severely limiting the amount of goods into the strip. The Israelis implemented this policy, not because they are inhumane barbarians, but rather, with the intent of demonstrating to the Gazan people that the Hamas leadership was, irresponsible, inept, and incapable of improving the lives and opportunities of Gazans. There were many problems with pursuing such a strategy, foremost among them that it did not work; Hamas’s power did not falter. Gaza’s suffering has created a humanitarian crisis that has attracted the watchful eye of media outlets worldwide. Literally, an underground economy proliferated, and Hamas had little incentive to adhere to a calming, from which they were not benefiting in any way. How long did Israel expect Hamas to lie and bleed before they attempted to improve their condition?
Israel, of course, could not blockade Gaza by itself; Gaza shares a border with Egypt. Egypt also participated in the siege, for reasons relating to its own national security, by closing its own border crossing with Gaza, the Rafah crossing. Cairo also intended to use the crossing as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from Hamas. In the past year, Egypt has acted as a mediator between Israel and Hamas and Hamas and the PLO. However, Egyptian mediation proposals, which Hamas officials continually claimed favored Abbas, proved ineffective as Hamas remained unwilling to cede its control over Gaza to Abbas in the name of Palestinian reconciliation. Egyptian mediation can now be said to have bottomed out entirely with Israel’s recent military action—a move Cairo is seen to have tacitly condoned, and perhaps, privately cheered after the Egyptians were publicly enraged by what they considered to be Hamas’s snubbing of Palestinian Reconciliation talks, spearheaded by Cairo. Protests and violence directed at Egypt’s embassies across the Arab world need to be viewed in light of Arab sentiments that Cairo acted as an accomplice to the Israeli bombings of Gaza. Furthermore, President Mubarak did not cover his political bases too well when he met with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni less than twenty-four hours before Israel launched its first strikes.
In sum, from an Israeli perspective and those of Hamas’s other regional adversaries, military action does little to solve the overall crux of the matter, which is Hamas’s existence and empowerment in Gaza, especially if Israel does not intend to make a long-term military commitment, as Israeli officials have suggested. However, a return to the status quo ante is not exactly desirable either. Hence, all things considered, Israel is stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to Hamas in Gaza. If anything, perhaps Israel simply hoped to delay or prevent a Hamas takeover in the West Bank, a contingency that may not be unlikely when Abu Mazen’s mandate as President expires in early January.
Lost in all these events is the fate of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier taken captive in the summer of 2006. If Israel had truly hoped to secure his return, it seems that now his fate is sealed. Though, in Israel’s calculation, Hamas demands in exchange for his release were outrageous, even during the tahdi‘a, which offered the best window of opportunity to ensure his release.
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Filed under: Al-Wahsh: The monster of commentary | Tags: Gaza, Gaza War, Israel
Haven’t posted in a while, here are some thoughts on the situation unfolding between Israel and Hamas.
Israel is conducting its current military campaign against Gaza in order to protect and defend some half million citizens in the western Negev, who are under persistent rocket barrage from Hamas. No doubt this is a motivating factor for the current military action, especially in light of upcoming elections in Israel. However, if the goal were to truly ensure Israel’s security, then why would the government choose to escalate the situation, in turn, making the security situation in Israel more perilous, something Israeli officials expected? More rockets have been launched by Hamas, more Israeli civilian casualties have been taken, and the increased possibility of large-scale intifada-type violence has spiked since military strikes have commenced, with the possibility of further escalation.
Seemingly, Israel is, at most, attempting to topple the Hamas government in Gaza and, at the very least, punishing them severely for not going away, even while Israel is certainly not interested in a long-term presence in the strip. In regards to the former objective, this is certainly achievable, but to what end? Renewing a tahdi‘a (Arabic: calming) that both Hamas and Israel felt was disadvantageous? Israeli action to punish Hamas amounts to taking a sledgehammer to a walnut. Punishment as such, however severe, is not a long-term strategy; but, obviously, some in the Israeli government felt it was the best immediate option among a short list of other less preferable ones.
In regards to the latter objective, the jury is still out as to the capability of Israel to achieve regime change, or elimination, with large-scale military force. After all, Hamas is a movement with a large constituency, not merely one leader or even a group of leaders. In other words, if you cut off the beasts head, it may simply grow two more that are uglier and nastier than the first. Furthermore, who would replace Hamas rule in Gaza? Surely not the Israelis or the Egyptians, both of whom want to wash their hands of the troublesome little territory. Then, Abbas? Some in the Fatah are sitting back in Ramallah relishing that Hamas is now paying dearly for their takeover of the strip in mid-2007 and for their refusal to reconcile with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah since that time. However, Abu Mazen’s legitimacy has been severely eroded by Israeli military action due to his prior diplomatic engagement with the Israelis and his obdurate, if not at times hostile, stance toward Hamas in Gaza. Indeed, since the initiation of Israeli strikes on Gaza, Abbas has remained mute. Though, in a step that should be viewed as a protective political measure, the PLO has announced the suspension of peace negotiations with Israel. This is an odd, perhaps unintended, consequence of Israel’s military action, considering Israel has spent the last year and a half trying to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas.
Israel has no good options for dealing with the Hamas government in Gaza. Since Hamas came to power in Gaza in mid-2007 and the tahdi‘a, agreed upon with Hamas through Egyptian intermediaries in mid-June of this year, Israel has attempted to starve Gaza by severely limiting the amount of goods into the strip. The Israelis implemented this policy, not because they are inhumane barbarians, but rather, with the intent of demonstrating to the Gazan people that the Hamas leadership was, irresponsible, inept, and incapable of improving the lives and opportunities of Gazans. There were many problems with pursuing such a strategy, foremost among them that it did not work; Hamas’s power did not falter. Gaza’s suffering has created a humanitarian crisis that has attracted the watchful eye of media outlets worldwide. Literally, an underground economy proliferated, and Hamas had little incentive to adhere to a calming, from which they were not benefiting in any way. How long did Israel expect Hamas to lie and bleed before they attempted to improve their condition?
Israel, of course, could not blockade Gaza by itself; Gaza shares a border with Egypt. Egypt also participated in the siege, for reasons relating to its own national security, by closing its own border crossing with Gaza, the Rafah crossing. Cairo also intended to use the crossing as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from Hamas. In the past year, Egypt has acted as a mediator between Israel and Hamas and Hamas and the PLO. However, Egyptian mediation proposals, which Hamas officials continually claimed favored Abbas, proved ineffective as Hamas remained unwilling to cede its control over Gaza to Abbas in the name of Palestinian reconciliation. Egyptian mediation can now be said to have bottomed out entirely with Israel’s recent military action—a move Cairo is seen to have tacitly condoned, and perhaps, privately cheered after the Egyptians were publicly enraged by what they considered to be Hamas’s snubbing of Palestinian Reconciliation talks, spearheaded by Cairo. Protests and violence directed at Egypt’s embassies across the Arab world need to be viewed in light of Arab sentiments that Cairo acted as an accomplice to the Israeli bombings of Gaza. Furthermore, President Mubarak did not cover his political bases too well when he met with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni less than twenty-four hours before Israel launched its first strikes.
In sum, from an Israeli perspective and those of Hamas’s other regional adversaries, military action does little to solve the overall crux of the matter, which is Hamas’s existence and empowerment in Gaza, especially if Israel does not intend to make a long-term military commitment, as Israeli officials have suggested. However, a return to the status quo ante is not exactly desirable either. Hence, all things considered, Israel is stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to Hamas in Gaza. If anything, perhaps Israel simply hoped to delay or prevent a Hamas takeover in the West Bank, a contingency that may not be unlikely when Abu Mazen’s mandate as President expires in early January.
Lost in all these events is the fate of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier taken captive in the summer of 2006. If Israel had truly hoped to secure his return, it seems that now his fate is sealed. Though, in Israel’s calculation, Hamas demands in exchange for his release were outrageous, even during the tahdi‘a, which offered the best window of opportunity to ensure his release.
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