Filed under: Schott-Gun | Tags: Arab Media, Propaganda, Responsibiity of the Media
I recently came across an interesting article in the New York Times entitled ‘Misreading the Arab media.’ The gist of the article is that the U.S. has a skewed vision of Arab media. Included in the article is a graphic containing information about the opinions of Arab journalists. It is enlightening, and for the most part makes the article’s point. Namely, that Arab media is more closely aligned ideologically speaking with the U.S. then previously realized and that it could be used as a powerful ally against extremism and terrorists in the Middle-East.
This is no doubt the truth, though I don’t believe for the reasons given in the article. The article makes interesting points, but I felt that it left an important component virtually unmentioned. (More on this later.)
Part of the graphic contains the results of a poll taken of Arab journalists. The question asked is: “It is the job of a journalist to…?” The poll included twenty possible responses, and each individual polled could select more than one answer to the question. The responses ranged from the most selected answer of “encourage political reform,” (chosen by 75% of respondents,) to the least selected answer of “represent employers interests,” (chosen by 6% of respondents.)
Most of the possible responses contained noble ideals, such as “Be a voice for the poor,” “Promote civic engagement,” and “Encourage development.” It is certainly my opinion that the region could benefit from things such as political reform and a transformation of society, all popular answers given to the question asked. However, I must wonder if these answers should be the role of the media. Certainly portions of the newspaper should be used to offer opinions and debate, that’s called the editorial section, but should that really be the primary purpose of the news? Should that be what is on the front page?
I always thought the purpose of the news was to offer facts. Apparently, that is not the opinion of the Arab journalists polled as only 24% responded to the question of “It is a job of the journalist to…?” with the answer of “simply report the facts.”
It seems Arab media suffers from the same disease that western media does. No longer are they in the business of reporting facts, rather, they are in the business of telling people what to think.
This is disappointing and dangerous. Sure, these media outlets could be co-opted by the U.S. to further our agenda in the Middle-East…for now. However, when we allow and encourage something other than the delivery of facts to be the ultimate goal of journalism, even if the intentions are good, then it will inevitably be debased into propaganda.
The Wikipedia definition of propaganda is: a concerted set of messages aimed at influencing the opinions or behaviors of large numbers of people. As opposed to impartially providing information, propaganda in its most basic sense presents information in order to influence its audience. Propaganda often presents facts selectively (thus lying by omission) to encourage a particular synthesis, or gives loaded messages in order to produce an emotional rather than rational response to the information presented. The desired result is a change of the cognitive narrative of the subject in the target audience to further a political agenda.
Based on this definition, the New York Times article implicitly advocates the use of propaganda. They would encourage that journalists deliver something other than the truth. To their credit, they don’t do so with malicious intent. In fact, they appear to be finding a means of assisting the U.S. defeat its enemies. Again, a noble intent and something which I strongly admire, but I still find this unacceptable.
If we are truly committed to developing transparency, freedom of speech, and political plurality in the Middle-East, then we should start by ensuring the media delivers facts, not propaganda. Only facts can expose the evils and ills of the Islamist agenda, and only facts can demonstrate that no faction holds the moral high ground or possesses a monopoly on suffering.
After all, facts, by their very definition, are the truth. Since when is the truth not enough? If our intentions are as righteous as we claim, if we really wish to spread freedom, then the truth should be.
And Jesus said “Then you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free”
- John 8:32
Filed under: Schott-Gun | Tags: Game Theory, Israel, Palestine, Prisoner's Dilemma
As I was doing some reading in the never-ending effort to increase my knowledge of war and politics, I happened to start analyzing the practical applications of Game Theory to current situations in the Middle-East. (As a warning to anyone interested in exploring Game Theory, it is heavy and tedious stuff. I apologize ahead of time if this writing reflects such.) Specifically, I focused in on the Game Theory problem commonly known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
For those who are unfamiliar with The Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is best explained like this: Two criminals are apprehended by the police (we’ll call them Criminal X and Criminal Y.) The authorities don’t have enough evidence to convict either man to a long prison sentence. Consequentially, the police isolate and interrogate each criminal separately. In an attempt to achieve a conviction, the police separately offer each criminal a deal.
The deal is this: if one of the convicts sells out his accomplice and the other refuses to cooperate with the police, the “rat” will walk free and his accomplice will serve a 20 year prison sentence. If both fail to cooperate with the police, then both will spend sometime in prison but will be released after 5 years. If both convicts cooperate with the police and rat the other out, then both will receive a 10 year prison sentence.
This leaves four possible results.
- Criminal X rats out Convict Y. Criminal Y stays silent. Criminal X goes free. Criminal Y receives a 20 year sentence.
- Criminal Y rats out Criminal X. Criminal X stays silent. Criminal Y goes free. Criminal X receives a 20 year sentence.
- Both Criminal X and Y stay silent. Both Criminal X and Y receive a 5 year sentence.
- Both Criminal X and Y rat out the other. Both Criminal X and Y receive a 10 year sentence.
Obviously, the dilemma for the prisoner is in what decision to make. Emotional variables such as loyalty and fear will influence their decision. Ultimately, someone will go to prison.
This exercise is interesting in and of itself, however, what really makes it fascinating (and more applicable) is when it is evolved into what is known as the “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.” This form is the same as the original except that the “game” is repeated and repeated AND that the players have a memory of previous rounds. It is important to keep in mind that the Criminals are not necessarily competing against each other. They are simply trying to serve as little time in prison as possible. Though both Criminals must make decisions based on how they think the other will act, the scenario does not automatically condemn them both to long prison sentences. Consequentially, it is to be considered a “Non-Zero Sum” game.
This repetition of the process and the memory of the players offer the potential for retaliation (or cooperation) by either of the “Criminals.” (For instance, if Criminal Y stays silent but gets betrayed in Round 1, he may feel the desire to retaliate against Criminal X by ratting him out in Round 2.) Of course, as before the desire for each of the “Criminals” is to serve as little time in prison as possible. The individual strategies employed will vary based on any number of factors.
A study was conducted in the 1980’s with the purpose of developing the optimal strategy for the “iterated” version of the game. Numerous academics, theorists, and computer programmers participated and numerous strategies were tested. After testing, an analysis of the top scoring strategies revealed several interesting facts. To come out on top in the game, a strategy must include four key components.
- It must not engage in a “First Strike.” That is, the player cannot “rat out” the other player before it is itself first the victim of such.
- It must be ready to retaliate. That is, a player who is “sold-out” must be prepared to retaliate in kind on the next round. (Strategies which were unwilling to retaliate were taken advantage of by less pacifistic strategies.)
- It must be willing to forgive. The strategy must be willing to occasionally forgive being “sold out’ by the other player. This means that if “sold out” the player must occasionally NOT retaliate even if it usually does. This is necessary to break a chain of retaliations which might occur. The inclusion of forgiveness is generally what separates a “Good” strategy from the “Best” strategy.
- It must not be “envious.” Meaning, the strategy cannot have the objective of trying to score more than the other player. (A “No First Strike” strategy precludes this.)
Critical Point #1: A “Good” strategy requires a player to retaliate. It is better to always retaliate than to let the other player repeatedly take advantage of a pacifistic strategy, even if both parties selling the other out is less optimal than if both stayed silent.
Critical Point #2: The best strategy to be pursued by each player individually therefore contains these four elements. IF both players pursue this optimal strategy, then in the end both players will stay silent round after round. This means that even a selfish player, for completely selfish and utilitarian motivations, will be restrained and forgiving.
Critical Point #3: However, a vengeful player may act hatefully round after round despite the fact that it WILL result in less benefit than if it had showed emotional restraint.
Now let’s change the scenario to reflect a war and peace scenario. In this case we will use the Palestinians and the Israelis. We will replace the option of selling-out the other player with the generically titled “Acts of Aggression.” We will replace the option of staying silent with the generically titled “Following the Peace Plan.” Instead of prison sentences we will use a simple numeric scoring system. For the purpose of the exercise we will say that a point equals a measure of any combination of economic prosperity, political/religious legitimacy and/or physical security.
Thus our model will go like this:
If Israel “Follows the Peace Plan” and the Palestinians engage in “Acts of Aggression,” then the Israeli’s will receive 0 points and the Palestinians will receive 10 points.
If Israel engages in “Acts of Aggression” and the Palestinians “Follow the Peace Plan” then the Israelis receive 10 points and the Palestinians receive 0 points.
If both Israel and the Palestinians engage in “Acts of Aggression” then both receive 1 point.
If both Israel and the Palestinians “Follow the Peace Plan” then they both receive 5 points.
This means that IF both the Israelis and the Palestinians follow the best possible strategy, they will both continuously “Follow the Peace Plan” despite any hate or anger aimed towards the other. (See Critical Point #2)
The problem regarding the situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians (or the Sunnis and Shiites, etc.) is that there are far too many individuals who would rather act vengefully despite the decreased benefit of such action. An unwillingness to forgive means that both parties, though they may be following a “Good” strategy, (See Critical Point #1) they are not following the “Best” strategy.
This is about where the application of all this comes to an end. Despite the somewhat technical components of it all, this is still an overly simplistic explanation of the situation.
It seems clear that the course of action which would lead to the most benefit to both parties would be for both the Israelis and the Palestinians to cooperate together and develop (and stick to) a peace plan.
Tragically, I fear this will never happen. Despite the seeming rationality of both parties following the “Best” strategy, it remains elusive in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is the region where the concept of an “Eye for an Eye” was invented. Tribal retribution is a way of life in much of the area. Culturally, forgiveness is in short supply. Based on my research and perspective, forgiveness is the key ingredient missing. With the addition of forgiveness, it might be possible to break the chain of conflict.
It is important to remember that in the hypothetical game, the cost of either side not following the “Best” strategy is only a loss of points.
In the real scenario, the cost is human lives…
United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced recently that General Petraeus, currently the commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-1,) has been selected to head United States Central Command (CENTCOM.) The position of CENTCOM commander was vacated last month when Admiral Fallon stepped down after causing “friction” with his superiors in Washington D.C. The selection of General Petraeus as the new commander of CENTCOM is, in my opinion, a wise choice. For understandable reasons, many people are skeptical regarding any plays made by the Bush Administration, particularly as it pertains to the Middle East. Despite this well deserved skepticism, here are five reasons why appointing Petraeus is a solid decision.
1) The CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) – United States Central Command is the U.S. military’s regional command of the greater Middle East and Central Asia. Its AOR spans from the Horn of Africa to the borders of China and Russia. (It used to include North Africa as well until the United States created AFRICOM last year.) The area CENTCOM is responsible for includes Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Obviously, the CENTCOM geographic area of responsibility is of vital interest to the U.S.’s War on Terror.
2) Low-Intensity Conflict – General Petraeus has demonstrated an acute knowledge of low intensity warfare, the kind of conflict which we currently face in Iraq and Afghanistan (and which Israel faced in the 2006 war with Hezbollah and currently in the Occupied Territories.) It is also the kind of conflict the world is most likely to see in third world countries in which adversaries can’t afford to compete with the U.S. in a high-intensity manner. (This just happens to include most of the countries and groups under CENTCOM’s umbrella.)
As a result of his academic focus, as well as other qualities, General Petraeus was chosen to co-author the new Army Field Manual on Counter-Insurgency Operations (FM-3-24.) This is a sharp contrast to most other senior military officers, who as a culture, are still focused on High-Intensity Conflict (such as Desert Storm.) The reasons for this are many, and certainly there is still a need for experts in this variety of warfare. However, given the region and the threat, it makes more sense to appoint someone such as General Petraeus considering the circumstances.
3) Academic Pedigree – His Masters in Public Administration and his PhD in International Relations, both from Princeton, gives him an academic pedigree far stronger than most of the alternative options for the post. These degrees were in the academic realm commonly known as the social sciences. Advanced degrees in social sciences are underrepresented amongst American senior officers. (This is due to a historical emphasis on more technical oriented degrees such as engineering.) This academic background likely gives him a tremendous leg up verse his peers when it comes to understanding the actions and motivations of peoples and processes. Though this might seem somewhat comical to civilians, it is a factor which can’t be underestimated.
4) Continuity – General Petraeus will bring continuity with him to the position of Commander of CENTCOM. Typically, Combatant Command positions, like the one which Gen. Petraeus will assume at CENTCOM, are two to three year appointments. This means that General Petraeus, unless forced to resign, will likely remain a key player on U.S. policy in South-West Asia until 2010 or later. Regardless of who is elected President in November, in General Petraeus they will have to deal with someone who is well acquainted with the harsher realities of the region and what U.S. interests there are.
So long as Gen. Petraeus continues to speak candidly and carefully (as he has during Congressional Hearings,) the next administration will have someone who will tell it like it is yet still follow orders. Hopefully, his realist perspective will temper any hasty actions which might be taken by the next administration, such as militarily engaging Iran or withdrawing from Iraq.
Aside from U.S. policy makers, General Petraeus will present continuity for regional players in the Middle East. Generals, Ambassadors, and heads of state which General Petraeus has made inroads with will be retained. Though his exact position in the American chain-of-command has changed, he will still likely be viewed as one of America’s chief diplomats in the region. His connections and acquaintance with regional players is vital, particularly considering the regions tendency of trusting individuals far more than institutions.
5) Morale – General Petraeus is probably the most respected individual serving in the military. No where does this respect emerge stronger than from the military. Those serving under him have consistently demonstrated their tremendous respect and admiration for him.
His appointment as head of CENTCOM sends a message to the ranks that the era of Rumsfeld is over. It shows that senior officers might be candid to their superiors (something Petraeus does consistently) without fear of getting fired from their job (something Rumsfeld did consistently.) It also demonstrates that those who are willing to take risks and make bold plays can get ahead in the military system. This is important, as the military traditionally tends to be a conformist society where trying new things is frowned upon. By promoting the individual most responsible for the execution of “The Surge” it shows the military community that their sacrifices made during its implementation cannot as yet be labeled a waste.
Tragically, the positive impact made by this appointment could be completely reversed if the next administration chooses to pre-maturely replace him. Regardless, considering the strain on American forces as a result of fighting “The Long War” as well as shoddy leadership in the recent past, this will undoubtedly improve morale.
