DancesWithCamels

My last post on this issue proved somewhat controversial, unsubstantiated for some and downright ludicrous for others. The topic is difficult due to the fact that it is an emotive issue and many approach the subject with strong pre-conceived notions about the appropriateness of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and Israel’s overall contribution to U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Here, I argue that Israel’s strategic importance to the U.S. and the majority of Arab states lies in the fact that Israel acts as a regional support for the Arab state order, something the U.S. and regional allies have a vested interest in ensuring. Should Arab states begin to unravel, the consequences for Arab governments would be their removal and U.S. interests in the region may be damaged beyond repair.

While proving resilient, Arab states face continuing challenges to state cohesion due to many factors—the Arab state system was created out of territories ruled by various Muslim empires for about 1300 years. The borders that were imposed according to colonial interests and the states formed as a result were in many ways anathema to the pre-existing regional order. Furthermore, strong sub-state and supra-state identities have proven durable and act as obstacles to state solidarity. Until 1967, Arab nationalism served as a supra-state identity that was harnessed by Arab leaders to threaten the sovereignty of individual Arab states. More recently, political Islam has emerged as a supra-state ideology presenting challenges to Arab regimes and the boundaries of their states. Moreover, sub-state identities and loyalties to them are now being evinced in Iraq in the wake of the U.S. invasion threatening fragmentation and restructuring of the Arab order. After almost a century of existence, the challenges to the Arab state emanating from the aforementioned factors have not been completely resolved.

So how does Israel help maintain the current Arab order? An historical example that comes to mind would be Israel’s safeguarding of Jordan against a Syrian invasion in 1970-71 when King Hussein was struggling to expel the PLO from Jordan. Had Israel not threatened an attack on Syria, the Syrians may have felt unhindered to move into Jordan. In the name of the Palestinian struggle, Syria also sought the removal of the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in order to establish their hegemony in what was viewed as a natural sphere of Syrian influence. In this case Israel was the only regional deterrent capable of staving off Syrian intervention. Israel’s unique strategic position in this case was realized by Nixon and Kissinger and raised Israeli strategic prestige for many in Washington.

More recently, Israel and the anti-Shi’i and anti-Iranian Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have common ground in the struggle to stem the rising tide of regional challengers: Iran and its proxies in the region seeking to destabilize and possibly overturn the regional order. Israel’s war in Lebanon in 2006 serves as a prime example. The status quo Arab states tacitly condoned Israel’s attempt to destroy Hezbollah and were perhaps frustrated that they didn’t do a better job. Why? Israel’s war against Hezbollah was virtually a war against Iran and its influence in Arab Lebanon. While the Arabs protested the excessive tactics used by the Israelis, Nasrallah was blamed for inciting the conflict and bringing war to Lebanon. Most urgently, Hezbollah threatens to ensconce Lebanon, a founding member of the Arab League, in the Iranian orbit. Such a prospect is unacceptable to the status quo Arabs and potentially devastating for regional order. Hence, Israel, the U.S. and the status quo Arabs all have a vested interest in buttressing the pro-Western coalition in Lebanon.

Israel is also trying to contain Hamas, an actor whose aspirations far exceed those of the Palestinian national struggle, by supporting Fatah and applying harsh measures against Gaza in an attempt to discredit Hamas (one can certainly contest the effectiveness of this strategy). While Fatah still holds sway in the West Bank, the strength of their military forces is semi-ambiguous. What, for example, would happen to Fatah if Israel evacuated completely from the West Bank? Would they fall to Hamas as quickly as they did in Gaza? The presence of the IDF in the West Bank makes a Hamas takeover there more difficult as Israel and the PA continue to work towards an agreement. The U.S. has a strong stake in playing a role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli crisis and one could surmise that a Hamas takeover of the Palestinian national project in all of the Palestinian territories would mean a degeneration of the conflict back into a zero-sum game.

In sum, Israel is a strategic ally for the U.S. and status quo Arab states in that it seeks to maintain the legitimacy of the current Arab order in the face of regional forces seeking to destabilize it, albeit for its own selfish reasons of being. In a time when the fate of Arab Iraq is indiscernible and Iranian influence in the region is at a level like no time in centuries, Arab states looking to maintain their rule, and the Arab order in place since the early 1920s, are not looking to Israel as their greatest threat. On an emotional and ideological level, Arab states and their populations are hostile to the existence of Israel and always will be. Hence, U.S. favoritism towards Israel damages America’s reputation in the Arab world but this doesn’t necessarily translate into irreparably harming America’s strategic interests. If anything, all the governments of the region are firmly embedded in the U.S. orbit with the exception of Syria and Iran and their sub-state clients. Radical forces that have arisen in the Arab world to oppose U.S. interests cannot simply be blamed on American support of Israel, though it is certainly a factor. Keep in mind that among Bin Laden’s many grievances foremost among them was the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, troops that were deployed there at the request of the Saudi ruling family to correct the disruption in the Arab state order brought about by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In terms of obstacles facing U.S.-Arab relations, the close U.S.-Israeli relationship is but one of many.