DancesWithCamels

The Institute of National Security Studies in Israel was the venue of a fascinating round table last evening. The panel featured three able, experienced and truly erudite individuals: Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli Ambassador to Israel and chief negotiator of Syrian-Israeli peace talks in the early 1990s, Saeb Erakat, the chief Palestinian negotiator for the past decade, and Daniel Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Cairo and Tel Aviv. Before a small audience of about 35 people some big issues were raised and discussed with a refreshing candor that only an open and academic setting can provide.

I’ll try to cut to the basics of the talk running over some of the most interesting points, but perhaps some context is necessary. The roundtable took place within the broader framework of a three day conference entitled, ‘The Global and the Local: International Efforts to Resolve local Conflicts.’ A discussion of the United States and its role in Middle Eastern peace, specifically in regards to the Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli tracks, was the theme addressed throughout the panel this blog entry is concerned with though it wasn’t the only issue.

In short, it was agreed that it is up to local actors to spearhead peace initiatives in the region, they are the actors most intimately involved, with the most understanding of what needs to be done to reach a deal, and with the most to lose or gain, hence they must act as the drivers. However, U.S. involvement is necessary, but as Rabinovich noted the U.S. should not enter the peace process too early rather it needs to step in late and play the role of closer, or in his words,“to go the last ten yards.” He used U.S. incentive of incrementally waiving Jordan’s $700 million dollar debt as an example of effective U.S. intervention in closing a deal (though this was almost spoiled by Newt Gingrich). The U.S. it was surmised, was not a great negotiator but rather a necessary facilitator. But while local actors need to initiate peace processes, Kurtzer noted that as a U.S. President you cannot ignore Middle East peace too long, it’s in U.S. interest to engage lest something occur that would bite Washington and its interests in the ass. Kurtzer (speaking from a realist perspective, as all of the panelists were) noted that the Bush administration excluded this from his Middle East policy and rather than expressing vigorous U.S. interest in Middle East peace at the outset of his tenure early on he turned to the issue at Annapolis late in the game when it was too late to be effective. However, if Kurtzer’s assessment is true and Annapolis fails due to the Bush administrations shunning of the issue throughout his tenure then Saeb Erakat provided some forlorn warnings for the future of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the wider region. Erakat spoke frankly. He wants nothing more than a Palestinian state next to Israel. He said this in certain terms and he was unequivocal that he desired this not out of compassion or new found love for the Jewish state but for the good of his own people, but he desired it nonetheless. A man in Erakat’s position harbors no illusions, he quipped “I am the most disadvantaged negotiator in history,” he hasn’t even a state. His message to this mostly Israeli audience was stark, “If I go to the Palestinian people at the end of 2008 with a successful agreement, Hamas will disappear. If not, I must be prepared to have my own disappearing act,” he continued that “If there is not an agreement by the end of 2008, this region will go down a path that no Americans or Europeans can prevent from becoming one of darkness and extremism.” (I’m not 100% sure on the accuracy of every word in these quotes but the main thrust is certainly correct). From these statements, one could deduce that Erakat is using urgency as a way to extract Israeli concessions in negotiations, however the man I saw speaking did not seem to believe that the elongation of the conflict was in his, Fatah’s, the Palestinian, Israeli, regional, U.S. or world interest. Erakat repeated throughout that the centers of gravity in the Middle East were shifting, traditional pillars of power were crumbling and the regional support systems of the last six decades were changing—and he certainly is not the first to suggest this, as a close observer of the region over the past few years this notion is widely held among students and scholars in the region. The shift Erakat spoke of is the regional tilt toward political Islam and the empowerment of these forces in Lebanon and in Gaza and towards the backer of this realignment, Tehran. The Abbas government, Erakat inferred, would be a partner in helping to roll this threat back and Israel had better recognize this by providing him the agreement he needed that would act as a club to beat Hamas with. He called the Hamas coup in Gaza “the worst thing to happen to the Palestinians since 1967,” and keep in mind the Palestinian national movement endured some pretty hard blows from June 1967 to June 2007. Was Erakat being dramatic? I don’t think so. Erakat was adamant that it was time for both sides to make the tough decisions and sacrifices to do a deal, the time for negotiations, confidence building measures, and consultations was over and if decisions aren’t made then there will be no one left on the Palestinian side to deal with. Erakat made an interesting case, but he seemed to suggest that both the Israelis and the Palestinians knew precisely what they would have to sacrifice to reach an agreement, that is which ‘issues’ they would have to compromise on. Personally, I am not certain the sacrifices are clearly defined while I hope that they get defined quickly and by the end of the year, I don’t know that they will. It seems however, that attainment of an agreement with Israel is the last gasp for Fatah and they will go a long way to achieve it, however Fatah would rather be put to the sword of Hamas rather than accept an incomprehensive and unsatisfactory Israeli offer, they will not present the Palestinians with an agreement out of humility. Erakat realized that a Palestinian state would be the most unique, powerless, and limited state in the world but he remarked that while this can be tolerated, “We will not allow anything to have limitations on our dignity.” It should be realized now that Israel in tandem with the U.S. will have to be partners in allowing the Palestinians that dignity. From the U.S.-Israeli perspective one major thing needs to be kept in mind in the crucial months ahead: Fatah’s end goal is a state side by side with Israel, Hamas’s differs radically.