DancesWithCamels

As has already been argued, a “way forward” in Iraq is more important to debate than the mistakes of the past. But let us step outside the framework of daily headlines and CNN specials about Iraq and attempt an interpretation of what is really happening there and what is at stake.

What is happening?

What is finally revealing itself to the world, but is not yet fully comprehended, is that Iraq is a divided country. When a headline is delivered in a way which depicts consistent infighting among different groups of Iraqis, or a so-called ceasefire is called, whether by Sunnis, Shi’is, or Kurds, it often fails to mention that this was common even before 2003. The Kurds have been used frequently by both Iraq and Iran to combat the other in an attempt to undermine and weaken each other’s regimes over the past century; the Shia of southern Iraq were also called upon by Iranian clerics to rise up against Iraq, and to the chagrin of Iran they did the opposite and instead cited their ethnically Arab ties to the Iraqi state as the reasons for repelling the Persian invaders. However, by calling upon the “Shia” groups, Iran successfully distinguished that group from others within Iraq and made them a target of a despotically paranoid dictator who then acted to crush them, which in turn caused them to rise up and attack the regime just as Iran wanted in the first place.

What is happening today is a result of two forces: the fractious tribal nature of Iraqi society, and the disenfranchising power of modernity on a “backward” country.

To form a unity government in Iraq it must incorporate three large and very different groups: the Sunnis, the Shi’is, and the Kurds. Each group has its own legitimate arguments for control of Iraq. Each group has a stake in the survival of Iraq. But each group refuses to work very closely with any of the others for various historical reasons. Iraq has a pendulum-like history of strong and weak central governments. Dating back to the Mandate period, the Iraqi state was created on a two-tiered system of governance. On one hand was the central government; on the other was the tribal sheikh. The hastily thrown-together state created during the Mandates of the early 20^th century was based on the false assumption that the tribal sheikhs had real authority over their tribes (“tribe” being a very loosely defined entity in itself). As was realized back then, the central government at the time was very weak and unable to impose any control on the restless and well-armed rural population. As a result, the central government’s main purpose was to create a national army which could then back up with firepower the words of the tribal sheikhs who imposed their authority over the rural populace (for a parallel, remember that the US mission in Iraq today is being redefined so that it provides “security” for the country in the form of police and military training).

This was all in theory. In practice the sheikhs had little authority without the despotic power of a central, or foreign, military. So with the coming of a strong central government, the tribes and tribal leaders submitted to the force of the elite in exchange for political appointments. The primary problem was that a government could only remain strong with a strong military, but in the Middle East a strong military is a very serious threat to the regime itself (especially seeing as how every regime in Iraq before and including Saddam’s came to power on the back of a military coup). To keep the military unified and its attention diverted elsewhere, Iraq instigated war after war with its neighbors and its own population which ultimately weakened the military and hence the central government almost to the point of no return. (this author realizes that this is a simplifying and reductionist view, but is maintaining brevity for better coherence).

In the fluctuation away from strong central government, the tribes, which had acted as a safety net for the population from Saddam’s brutality, re-emerged as a guiding force in the rural countryside of Iraq. Saddam, seeing this internal weakness, then began to rely on the tribes in place of a faltering system of strong central government. But only those tribes who pledged allegiance to him were relied upon; making some tribes “Ba’thists” and others “Opponents.” “Opponents” in Iraq were often the rebellious Kurdish or Shia groups. These groups were typically hunted and killed by the regime. If they felt substantially threatened, they fled the country; usually to Iran.

So with the fall of Saddam, you had two groups from which to pick a new government: former Ba’thists and exiles returning from the West and/or Iran. Neither of these options is acceptable to the average Iraqi citizen who prefers someone who stayed in the country to resist Saddam, and shared in the misery of the Saddam years. This means those in Iraq who have any political aspirations are generally those who fit into the two categories of people who the Iraqis would prefer to not rule the country.

The other main issue facing Iraq is the force of modernity. To build a military machine, Saddam had to speed up the industrialization of his country. Land reforms and industrialization policies forced rural citizens to move to the cities and work in factories. As more military equipment was purchased and more wars were fought, more and more Iraqis were employed by the government or the military, both of which grew exponentially under Saddam. When Saddam shifted back to the forces of tribalism he discovered the tribes were but a shell of their former selves and lacked any real coherence. By then fictively “creating” tribes, and hiring them within the government, the bureaucracy of the state, which was enormous by that time, experienced a large shift away from normal functions and took on a tribal flavor causing wider nepotism and reallocation of manpower. What resulted was mass unemployment of varying sections of society.

Today, the Coalition forces face two main problems. The first is whether or not the tribal sheikhs who are currently being relied on are really as powerful as initially thought, or whether they are simply the falsely “created” tribal leaders of Saddam Hussein (what Iraqi expert Charles Tripp labels “elements of Saddam’s shadow state”). The second is the social conditions created by a large chunk of the country’s population being under the age of 35 and unemployed. This is primarily due to the fact that these young men were steadily rising in their positions under Saddam Hussein by serving in his military or giant bureaucracy throughout the 23 years of war and conflict he symbolized, and now cannot get a job through anything more than their tribal affiliations, which are weak and ill-defined at best.

What is at Stake?

As I see it, three things are at stake. One is the credibility of the American role in international politics. The second is the stability of the Middle East. The third is the threat of a rapid rise in international Islamist terrorism. I’ll keep this brief.

1. Since the end of the Cold War America has attempted to redefine the nature of its power and how best to use it. Forgetting the humanitarian success in regards to an internationally accepted view of human rights and genocide, the US has largely failed, albeit subjectively, in most endeavors undertaken since 1991. Operation Iraqi Freedom was the pinnacle of these policies. Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Haiti were all attempts to re-order America’s position, but Iraq is the quagmire deep enough to really affect a change in attitude. When this conflict is concluded, whether through early withdrawal or the creation of a stable country, America will have more clearly defined its role in international affairs. Period.

2. An early withdrawal will result in civil war and failure. A resumption of the occupation will inevitably be compared to Vietnam and force said withdrawal. Without the support of Iraq’s neighbors, without internal stability, and, controversially, without an American military presence, the Middle East could potentially erupt into a wider conflict. With Kurdish separatism, fears of a Shi’i uprising and Iranian takeover in the Gulf, Turkish aggression, elusive peace in Israel-Palestine, aging monarchs in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and a catastrophic refugee problem, it is hard to envision World War III starting in any region besides the Middle East.

3. With instability comes unemployment. With unemployment comes dissatisfaction with government, which leads to a delegitimizing of government and either a government crack-down or a civil revolt. These are seeds which contribute to religious fundamentalism and create rapid increases in the success of terrorist and insurgent recruitment drives. Paradoxically, the War on Terror may potentially create more instability by weakening the governments which hold sway over their populations by asking, or allowing, them to crack down on those groups which hold the power to overthrow or assassinate them if pushed too far by government violations of their human rights.

What can be done?

You can’t know where you’re going, until you know where you’ve been. Historical understandings offer a look into the present, and give you the ability to prepare for the future. These are simple platitudes that were ignored when the Americans entered Iraq. To redefine the “way forward” certain policies need to be revamped. These are enumerated briefly below:

1. Without intimate knowledge of the people whom a political or foreign service officer is working with, he or she cannot accurately advise policy. Extending the service time of diplomats and advisors to at least two years would be required for them to learn the language of the local populace and also compile the necessary census and population data needed to understand the intricacies of such a complex and fractious society.

2. The borders of the country must be secured. US troop levels would have to be increased to monstrous proportions to do this. This is not politically possible at the current time, but if the US is serious about making Iraq secure, this may be something worth investing in.

3. Iraq’s neighbors must be engaged and asked to invest in the survival and stability of Iraq. If I am not mistaken this step has already been addressed by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, among others, in the recently televised hearings.

4. Understand that by propping up tribal groupings and militias, seeds are being sewn to tear Iraq apart from the inside. Self-interested sheikhs and religious leaders divide the country along tribal and religious lines in a country already rife with both. A focus on the nationalistic character of Iraqis needs to be bolstered by weakening the institution of the tribal sheikh and educating people away from the irrationality of certain religious leaders who call for martyrdom and insurgency. An Iraq created on the foundation of ethnic and religious lines is bound to fight a civil war (parallel this with Lebanon).

5. Point four cannot be accomplished without a strong internal economy, low unemployment, and a stable currency. Without these things terrorist organizations will be increasingly successful in finding disaffected youth to join their ranks, and the society will be ever more resentful at the occupation. Without making clear headway in this arena, the Americans will undoubted find themselves facing the same political concerns as they did in Vietnam where the extent of actions taken did not necessarily have an impact on what eventually happened. Local businessmen and land-owners should be given support so they can establish their businesses and expand their operations to employ more Iraqis and boost the infrastructure of the country as well as give Iraqis a stake in the stability of their neighborhoods. Politics are implemented at the local, not national or international, level.